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Abstract
We characterize optimal selling mechanisms in auction environments where bidders must incur
a cost to learn their valuations. These mechanisms specify for each period, as a function of the
bids in previous periods, which new potential buyers should be asked to bid. In addition, these
mechanisms must induce the bidders to acquire information about their valuations and to reveal
this information truthfully. Using a generalized Groves principle, we prove a very general “full
extraction of the surplus” result: the seller can obtain the same profit as if he had full control over
the bidders’ acquisition of information and could have observed directly their valuations once they
are informed. We also present appealing implementations of the optimal mechanism in special
cases.
If you see this, and we have not made any mistake, you are seeing a version of this paper
compiled so as to be easier to read on a screen. Another version, more appropriate for printing, is
available. If you find this version useful, or if you have any other comment, please tell us.
Hint If you are using Acrobat and follow an hyperlink, you can get back to the original place
by doing Alt-left arrow.
1. Introduction
Most of the auction literature assumes that the bidders have private information about their will-
ingness to pay and that they use this information strategically. In reality, however, bidders may
need to incur a cost to discover how much they value the object that is up for sale. For instance,
when governments sells spectrum, telecommunication companies must expend resources to find
out how much they value this spectrum, especially if they are going to use it for new services for
which the underlying technologies are not yet fully developed. Likewise, potential bidders for the
assets of a bankrupt firm must evaluate the potential synergies with their existing assets.
A number of authors have studied auctions with endogenous entry and information acquisi-
tion.1 This literature considers one-shot auctions to which it appends a preliminary stage in which
potential bidders can simultaneously and independently decide whether or not to enter and/or ac-
quire costly information. It typically studies exogenously given auction formats and studies the
bidders’ strategies, sometimes comparing the profits of the seller under different formats.
A few authors have considered optimal auctions with endogenous acquisition of information.
Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2001) consider a (one shot) optimal auction problem in which the
seller can choose the accuracy with which bidders (costlessly) learn their valuations prior to the
auction. Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002) consider a (one shot) general mechanism design prob-
lem in which agents can acquire costly information of varying qualities before participating in the
mechanism. In both cases though, the acquisition of information is done simultaneously by all
1See, for instance, Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2001), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993), Levin and Smith (1994),
Matthews (1984), McAfee and McMillan (1987), Persico (2000), Stegeman (1996), Tan (1992), Ye (2004), and Klem-
perer (1999) for a survey.
agents before they participate. However, in many cases it is optimal to examine the willingness of
the potential bidders to pay sequentially, so that the number of bidders who enter the mechanism
and the time at which they enter is an integral part of the mechanism design. In general then, op-
timal mechanisms will be multistage: buyers will enter the mechanism in turn and will participate
in a sequence of auctions rather than in a one-shot auction.
Our aim in this paper is to characterize optimal selling mechanisms when potential buyers do
not know at the outset how much they value the good for sale but can privately learn this value at
a cost. Our main result is that the seller can, in very general circumstances, completely overcome
the buyers’ incentive problems, and loses no profit due to the fact that the buyers’ have private
information about their value once they acquired it . This result is very general: it holds whether or
not the buyers’ types are independent, whether or not the acquisition of information is observable,
and can be extended to cases where the acquisition of information proceeds through several stages.
The proof is constructive: given the search procedure built under the assumption that the bidders
are honest, we show that it is possible to complement it with transfers that induce the bidders to
truthfully reveal the value that they attach to the object for sale. Therefore, under our assumptions,
the difficulty in finding an optimal auction format is the “Operations Research” problem of finding
the optimal search procedure, not the economic problem of giving incentives to the buyers.
We believe that our main result is important for at least three reasons. First, it fully identifies
the optimal mechanism in the setup used by most of the literature on endogenous acquisition of
information in auctions. Second, in order to prove this result in its full generality, we introduce a
dynamic extension of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves insight
that under some circumstances it is possible to make the agents internalize the consequences of
their announcements has been a linchpin of mechanism design, and a precise description of the
cases where it can be extended to multi-period setups should help think through dynamic problem.
Third, as far as we know, only Burguet (1996) has studied optimal procurement mechanisms
in a setting similar to ours.2 Translated into our auction setting, his model considers a seller who
faces a number of potential buyers whose valuations are i.i.d. The buyers need to incur a cost
to learn their respective valuations and can do so only one at a time. In our setting, the buyers’
valuations need not be independent and search need not be strictly sequential.3 However, when
the bidders’ valuations are independent (but not necessarily i.i.d.), we provide a generalization of
Burguet’s results which provides precise guidance for the construction of sequential auctions.
The paper is organized as follows. After introducing some notation and proving some prelimi-
nary results in Section 2, we discuss in Section 3 optimal mechanisms in special cases where they
have nice interpretable properties. We develop our most general results in Sections 4 and 5. In
Section 4, we present a mechanism that implements the first-best search procedure and show that
the mechanism induces truth telling. In Section 5 we show that this mechanism provides buyers
with proper incentives to acquire information. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Three other papers, McAfee and McMillan (1988) as well as Cre´mer, Spiegel, and Zheng (2006 and 2007), study
optimal auctions in which the principal needs to incur a cost in order to communicate with potential bidders. In these
papers, the participation constraints of the bidders are interim rather than ex ante as in the current paper.
3We discuss the differences between Burguet’s framework and ours further in Section 3.3.
2. The model and preliminary analysis
2.1. Utilities and information acquisition
The seller is selling a single good, for which he has zero value. There is a finite set I of potential
buyers, or briefly buyers. The time horizon consists of discrete periods. Ex ante, a buyer i’s utility
from consuming the good, which we will call his value, is uncertain. This value, vi for buyer i, is
drawn from a measurable set Vi, with a strictly positive density on that set, but its exact realization
is unknown to the buyer or to the seller until the buyer acquires information. For our most general
results, the vis need not be independent from each other. When a buyer acquires information he
perfectly learns his value.4 It is common knowledge that the cost that buyer i bears when acquiring
information is ci ≥ 0.
We make assumptions that ensure that it is not optimal to have buyers participating in the auc-
tion without acquiring information (see below). This implies that in an optimal search procedure,
there is no point in bypassing the information acquisition steps before selling the good to a buyer.
Moreover, we assume that the seller can control the buyers’ access to information and can prevent
buyers from acquiring information prematurely before he asks them to do so. For the moment
we will also assume that the acquisition of information is contractible: each buyer must acquire
information when the seller asks him to do so and only then. In Section 5 however we show that
this assumption is not necessary for our results to go through: we prove that the mechanism that
we construct in Section 4 also provides buyers with proper incentives to acquire information. A
4Adding more notation, our model and results can be extended to situations where a buyer cannot acquire informa-
tion until a certain time and information acquisition may take several periods.
buyer is said to be uninformed before he acquires information, and informed afterwards.
The payoffs of the seller and every buyer are of the quasi-linear form standard in mechanism
design, which implies that they are risk neutral. In particular, given that the value of the good
for the seller is zero, the seller’s payoff is equal to the expected discounted payments that the
buyers make, while the payoff of each buyers is equal to the discounted value of the good from his
perspective, conditional on him winning it, minus his discounted expected payments to the seller
and minus his discounted cost of acquiring information. In any period t, the discount factor for
the payoff available in the next period is δt ∈ (0, 1], identical for everyone. In order to simplify
notation, we will assume, contrary to the convention in the search literature, that when a buyer
acquires information in a given period, he can consume the good in that same period.
Note on information acquisition. Using the terminology of Cre´mer, Khalil and Rochet (1998a),
we assume that information acquisition is “productive” in the sense that the information is needed
to begin consuming the good.5 For instance, a buyer of a controlling block of shares in a firm,
must examine the firm’s books and evaluate the firm’s strategy (i.e., “acquire information”) before
exercising his control over the firm. Similarly, a builder who wins a construction contract must
examine the plans, evaluate the sources of supply, etc., before beginning the construction. In
these cases, all the information acquisition costs incurred in order to choose a bid would have
been incurred anyway after winning the auction. Then, the seller never loses by asking the bidder
to collect information before acquiring the good; this is clear when there is no asymmetry of
information, as in the optimal search procedure defined in section 2.2 and consequently, it is also
5In general, information acquisition could also be “strategic.” That is, the information allows the bidder to enjoy
information rents but is not needed in order to consume the good.
true for the optimal mechanisms which we define below.
2.2. Search procedures
In this subsection, we define “search procedures”, which provides instructions on which buyers
should acquire information at each period, when to end the process, and which buyer should even-
tually get the good. A search procedure then corresponds to the Operations Research part of the
seller’s problem assuming that once ci is spent, the seller learns buyer i’s value, vi, along with
buyer i. In 2.3, we define selling mechanisms, which take into account the fact that each buyer
i privately learns vi and must be induced to reveal it truthfully. We make a careful distinction
between these two concepts because our main aim is to prove Theorem 1, which states that under
a fairly weak condition, it is always possible to complement the optimal search procedure with
appropriate transfers that transform it into a selling mechanism.
A search procedure provides instructions on which buyers should acquire information at each
period, when to end the process, and which buyer should eventually get the good. All of these
decisions are based on the values of those who have already acquired information.6 To avoid
triviality, we assume that the optimal search is such that at least one buyer acquires information
in period 1 and until the procedure stops, at least one buyer acquires information in every period.7
6It is helpful to think about a search procedure as the analog of “allocation” in a traditional mechanism design
framework in which agents know their values at the outset. Like an allocation, a search procedure is a function of
realized values. (Whether these values are thruthfully revealed or not is an issue that will be dealt with later when we
define our mechanism).
7As long as the mechanism does not stop, it is never suboptimal for at least one buyer to get information and, if
δt < 1 for all t, then this is strictly optimal.
Given this assumption, a search procedure takes the following form. In period 1, a set I1 of buyers
acquire information. Let v1 be the information profile at the end of period 1 which specifies
the values of buyers in I1 and assigns the value ∅ for buyers who are not in It. For instance, if
I1 = {1, 2, 3} and v1 = 2, v2 = 0, and v3 = 6, then v1 = (2, 0, 6, ∅, . . . , ∅). Contingent on v1,
the search either ends and the buyer with the highest known value gets the good, or the search
continues to period 2. For any t ≥ 2, let vt−1 be the information profile at the end of period
t − 1. Given vt−1, a set It(vt−1) of previously uninformed buyers acquire information in period
t and vt is obtained from vt−1 by replacing the ∅ corresponding to the buyers in It(vt−1) by their
true values. For instance, in the context of our previous example, if I2(v1) = {4, 6}, v4 = 7 and
v6 = 3, then v2 = (2, 0, 6, 7, ∅, 3, . . . , ∅). Contingent on vt, the search either ends or continues to
period t+ 1. If the search procedure ends, the seller gives the good to one of the buyers. A formal
definition of search procedures appears in Appendix D.
A search procedure is said to be first-best or equivalently optimal if it maximizes the expected
present discounted value of the social surplus among all search procedures provided that all buyers
are obedient and honest. Given our assumptions, it is trivial to show that there exists an optimal
search procedure such that the good is given to the informed buyer with the highest value (for a
proof, see Appendix D). Since a buyer needs to acquire information anyway before consuming,
the seller has no reason to give the good to an uninformed buyer: asking the buyer to acquire
information before giving him the good can only benefit the seller by allowing him to make a more
efficient decision.
2.3. Mechanisms
When the information acquired by the buyers is private, the seller chooses a mechanism intended
to elicit this information from the buyers. In this paper we restrict attention to either auction
mechanisms or to revelation mechanisms. Both types of mechanisms are designed to implement
the first-best search procedure and extract the full surplus from each buyer.8 That is, they are
designed to generate the first-best procedure on the equilibrium path. Therefore, in both types of
mechanisms buyers are asked to acquire information in the same sequence as in the first-best search
procedure. Until Section 5 we assume that information acquisition is contractible and hence do not
need to worry about the buyers’ incentives to acquire information when they are asked to do so. In
Section 5 we will prove that the mechanism that we construct in Section 4 for the general case also
provides buyers with proper incentives to acquire information. In auction mechanisms, informed
buyers are asked to submit bids above reserve prices that are chosen by the seller. Given these
bids, the mechanism either stops and the good is allocated to the highest bidder or it continues and
additional buyers are asked to acquire information. In revelation mechanisms, informed buyers are
asked to publicly announce their values as soon as they become informed and each announcement
is associated with a probability of receiving the good and a transfer. To both types of mechanisms
we add admission fees that each buyer commits to at the beginning of period 1, before any buyer
has acquired information, to pay the seller.
8We do not prove that the types of mechanisms that we consider are the only ones that implement the first-best:
there could be other types of mechanisms that will also do that.
2.4. Extracting the buyers’ surplus: the efficiency principle
The seller can charge each buyer i an admission fee, Ti, equal to the buyer’s expected payoff from
participation in the mechanism. The admission fee, Ti, can be increased up to the point where the
individual rationality constraint of buyer i is just binding. Since buyers have no private information
ex ante, the admission fees fully extract the expected surplus from each buyer. We refer to this fact
as the efficiency principle.
Lemma 1 (The efficiency principle) For any mechanism, there exists a mechanism that yields the
same outcome and gives each buyer zero ex ante surplus.
Lemma 1 implies that we only need to find a mechanism that implements the optimal search
procedure. If such a mechanism exists, then, by using admission fees, the seller will be able to
extract the full surplus from the buyers and his payoff will be equal to the entire social surplus
generated by the optimal search.
A few remarks about Lemma 1 are in order. First, the admission fees are akin to a fixed fee in
a two-part tariff. As in a two-part tariff where the per-unit price is designed to induce the buyer
to make an optimal purchasing decision while the fixed fee extracts the buyer’s surplus, here the
socially efficient mechanism implements the first-best search procedure, while the admission fees
fully extract the bidders’ surplus. The difference however is that achieving social efficiency in our
dynamic search context is much more challenging than in the standard monopoly model.
Second, it should be emphasized that it is not necessarily optimal for the seller to merely ex-
tract all the surplus from the potential buyers; the seller still needs to implement a socially efficient
search procedure. To illustrate this point, consider a setup with infinitely many ex ante identical
potential buyers, and no discounting. Suppose that potential buyers acquire information simulta-
neously and then participate in an English auction without admission fees or reserve price. At any
mixed strategy symmetric equilibrium, potential buyers will obtain a zero expected surplus and
hence all the surplus will be captured by the seller. This mechanism, however, does not economize
on the cost of information acquisition and hence is suboptimal.9
Third, it should be noted that the buyers do not have to actually pay the admission fees up
front. The seller only needs to require each buyer to commit ex ante, to pay, when the buyer is
invited to acquire information, a fee that is equal to the buyer’s discounted expected surplus from
participation. For instance, suppose that the discount factor is constant over time, so that δt = δ
for all t, and let qi be the probability that buyer i is invited to acquire information. Then, instead of
paying Ti up front, buyer i can commit ex ante to pay Tiqiδt−1 in period t if he is invited to acquire
information in that period. The resulting expected payoffs of seller and the buyers are the same as
in the case where the buyers pay admission fees up front. (See 3.3 and specially Proposition 2 for
discussion of admission fees in a special case.)
9As we shall see in section 3.1, the socially efficient search procedure is such that at each period, a single poten-
tial bidder is invited to privately acquire information and announce his value. The procedure ends when one of the
announced values exceeds a predetermined cutoff.
3. Sequential search with independent values
In this section, we make three assumptions which are not used in the rest of the paper. First, the
buyers’ values are independently (but not necessarily identically) distributed: the distribution of
buyer i’s value, Fi, is smooth and independent across i, with support Vi = [0, v¯] for all i. Second,
we assume that the optimal search procedure is sequential in the sense that only one buyer can
acquire information in each period.10 Third, we assume that the discount factor is constant over
time, so that δt = δ for all t. In the next section we relax these assumptions and consider the
general case in which the buyers’ values are possibly correlated, the optimal search procedure may
be parallel and stochastic, and the discount factor need not be constant over time.
The first-best sequential search procedure in the independent values case has been characterized
by Weitzman (1979). We will first show that this procedure can be implemented by a mechanism
with an attractive economic interpretation and will then specialize the problem to the case where
the buyers’ values are identically distributed.
3.1. The optimal search procedure
We begin by reviewing briefly Weitzman’s characterization of the optimal search procedure. To
this end, suppose that before the seller faces buyer i, he already has the opportunity to sell the good
to someone else at a price k. The seller’s expected discounted payoff if he asks buyer i to acquire
10Vishwanath (1992) shows that the optimal search procedure must be sequential if the discount factor is close
enough to 1, or if the cost of information acquisition is sufficiently high. Institutional or physical constraints could
also forbid two buyers from acquiring information at the same time.
information is
Si(k) = δ
[∫ k
0
kdFi(vi) +
∫ v
k
vidFi(vi)− ci
]
. (1)
This expression reflects the fact that if buyer i’s value, vi, falls short of k, then the good is sold
at price k but if vi exceeds k then the good is sold at price vi. The seller benefits from asking
buyer i to acquire information in period t if and only if this improves his expected payoff, i.e., if
Si(k) > k. Noting that S ′i(·) > 0, the equation
Si(ki) = ki, (2)
implicitly defines ki as the cutoff such that the seller will ask buyer i to become informed only if
ki ≥ k. It is worth noting that ki depends only on the distribution of vi and on the cost ci but is
independent of the distributions of other buyers’ values and their costs of acquiring information.
To avoid triviality we assume that ki ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I .
Weitzman proves that the optimal search procedure takes the following simple form. In any
period t = 1, 2, ..., n, if the highest value among all informed buyers is greater than or equal to the
cutoffs of all uninformed buyers, the procedure stops and the good is sold to the informed buyer
with the highest value. Otherwise, the procedure continues and the seller asks the buyer with the
highest cutoff among all uninformed buyers to acquire information in period t + 1. If all buyers
become informed, the good is sold to the buyer with the highest value.
3.2. An optimal mechanism
By the efficiency principle, it is sufficient to show that Weitzman’s optimal search procedure can
be implemented. The Weitzman auctions mechanism which we present below does this. In Section
3.2.1, we present a general description of the mechanism; in Section 3.2.2, we define precisely the
reserve prices that must be used in the auctions that are held at each stage of the mechanism; in
Section 3.2.3 we formally state the main result of this section, Proposition 1.
The mechanism
The seller begins by labelling the buyers in a descending order of cutoffs, so that k1 ≥ . . . ≥ kN ,
and charges the buyers the appropriate admission fees that extract all their expected surplus from
participating in the mechanism.
In period 1, buyer 1 is instructed to acquire information about his value. The seller then makes
buyer 1 a take-it-or-leave offer at a price p11, which we will define below; if the offer is accepted,
the mechanism stops. Otherwise, the mechanism continues to period 2.11
If the mechanism reaches period t = 2, . . . , N − 1, then buyer t is instructed to acquire infor-
mation. Once buyer t becomes informed, buyers 1 to t participate in a second-price auction with
period- and buyer-specific reserve prices: the reserve price assigned to buyer i in period t is pti. The
mechanism stops if at least one buyer submits an eligible bid, i.e., bids a price above his reserve
price. If only buyer i submits an eligible bid, he obtains the good and pays pti. If several buyers
submit eligible bids, then the highest bidder obtains the good and pays the maximum of his reserve
price and the highest losing eligible bid.12 If no buyer submits an eligible bid, the mechanism
11The take-it-or-leave-it offer in period 1 can be interpreted as a second-price auction with a single buyer and a
reserve price p11.
12If two or more buyers submit the same high bid, the good is allocated to either one of them with equal probability.
When the buyers’ values are drawn from continuous distributions that have no mass points, ties are zero probability
events on the equilibrium path.
continues to period t + 1. If the mechanism reaches the final period N , then, after the last buyer,
buyer N , becomes informed, the seller holds a second-price auction without reserve prices that
includes all N buyers.
If some buyer i submits an eligible bid in any period t < N , then the mechanism stops for sure
in that period (either buyer i or another buyer who submits a higher eligible bid wins). Hence, the
situation is similar to a (one-shot) second-price auction and it is therefore a dominant strategy for
bidder i to bid his true value. However, unlike one-shot second-price auctions, here only a subset
of the potential buyers is informed in any period t < N and can bid. Therefore, informed buyers
may be tempted to end the mechanism “too early” in order to avoid having to compete against a
larger number of informed buyers in later periods. The period- and buyer-specific reserve prices
must be low enough to counteract this incentive. On the other hand, if the reserve prices are too
high, informed buyers will refrain from submitting eligible bids in the hope that the mechanism
will proceed, in which case they may have a another chance to win the good for a lower price.
Consequently, the period- and buyer-specific reserve prices must ensure that all informed buyers
will submit eligible bids in period t if and only of their respective values are equal to or above the
cutoff kt+1. This ensures that the mechanism will implement the outcome of the first-best search
procedure whereby search stops at period t if and only if the highest known value in that period
exceeds the cutoff kt+1. In the next subsection (which the reader can skip without any loss of
continuity) we derive the appropriate reserve prices.
Computing the reserve prices
We construct reserve prices such that if vi = kt+1 for some buyer i ≤ t, then this buyer is indifferent
between bidding vi in period t or waiting for period t + 1 to bid. We show in Appendix A that,
because the bidders’ payoffs are monotone increasing in their values, buyer i will bid in period t if
and only if vi ≥ kt+1.
Formally, for any period t and any buyer i ≤ t, let vt−i be the maximum of the values of all
buyers who are informed in period t excluding buyer i. On the equilibrium path, buyer i knows
in period t > 1 that the values of the t − 1 buyers who became informed in periods 1 through
t − 1 must be less than kt, otherwise at least one of these other buyers would have submitted an
eligible bid in period t − 1 and the mechanism would not have reached period t. Therefore, from
i’s viewpoint, the cumulative distribution of vt−i conditional on v
t
−i being less than kt is
H t−i(v
t
−i) =
F t−i(v
t
−i)
F t−1−i (kt)
,
where
F t−i(·) =
∏
1≤j≤t
j 6=i
Fj(·).
It is worth noting that each buyer i 6= t faces t − 2 informed buyers whose values are known to
be below kt and one informed buyer, buyer t, whose value is drawn from the interval [0, v] (buyer
t did not participate earlier so nothing is known about his value). By contrast, buyer t faces t − 1
buyers whose values are all known to be below kt.
Let us begin by computing pN−1i , the reserve price for buyer i in period N − 1. Since in
equilibrium all other informed buyers submit eligible bids in period N − 1 if and only if their
values exceed kN , buyer i with vi = kN can win in period N − 1 only if vN−1−i < kN (the values of
all other informed bidders are below his own so that none of them submits an eligible bid). Since
buyer i is the sole bidder whenever he wins, he ends up paying his reserve price pN−1i . Hence, his
expected payoff is (
kN − pN−1i
)
FN−1−i (kN).
On the other hand, if buyer i waits for period N , he wins the auction held in period N only if the
values of all other bidders, including bidder N , are lower than his own value. On the equilibrium
path, all informed buyers other than i submit eligible bids in period N − 1 if and only if their
values exceed the cutoff kN , implying that the mechanism proceeds to period N with probability
FN−1−i (kN). Hence, buyer i’s discounted expected payoff from waiting for period N is
δFN−1−i (kN)
∫ kN
0
(
kN − vN−i
)
dHN−i(v
N
−i).
Therefore the reserve price pN−1i must satisfy(
kN − pN−1i
)
FN−1−i (kN) = δF
N−1
−i (kN)
∫ kN
0
(
kN − vN−i
)
dHN−i(v
N
−i),
which, by definition of HN−i(·), is equivalent to(
kN − pN−1i
)
FN−1−i (kN) = δ
∫ kN
0
(
kN − vN−i
)
dFN−i(v
N
−i). (3)
For t ≤ N − 2, we obtain(
kt+1 − pti
)
F t−i(kt+1) = δ
(
kt+1 − pt+1i
)
F t+1−i (kt+2) (4)
+δ
∫ kt+1
kt+2
(
kt+1 − vt+1−i
)
dF t+1−i (v
t+1
−i ).
The left-hand side is similar to that of (3); it is derived from the expected payoff of buyer i if
he submits an eligible bid in period t. The right-hand side has a different form, because of the
presence of the reserve price in period t + 1: buyer i will pay pt+1i if v
t+1
−i < kt+2, hence the first
term on the right-hand side of (4); he will pay vt+1−i if v
t+1
−i > kt+2, hence the second term which
resembles the right-hand side of (3). Here again, the reserve prices in any period t < N − 1
are chosen to counteract the informed buyers’ temptation to end the mechanism “too early” and
thereby avoid competition from a larger number of informed buyers in later periods.
The main result for sequential search with independent values
Having derived the needed reserve prices we can now state the main result in this section. The
proof of Proposition 1 appears in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 In the sequential search model with independent values, the Weitzman auctions
mechanism with reserve prices defined by (3) and (4) has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium that
extracts the full surplus. The reserve prices for any given period t < N are set below the cutoff
kt+1 associated with searching for one more period.
As argued above, the reserve prices ensure that all buyers will submit eligible bids in period t
if and only if their respective values are equal to or above the cutoff kt+1. Since in every period
t < N , some buyers are still uninformed and hence cannot place bids, the reserve prices represent
the future competitive pressure from these potential buyers. This pressure eliminates the incentives
of informed buyers to bid “too early.”
It may be worthwhile to point out that Proposition 1 does not depend crucially on the fact that
only one buyer obtains information in every period. The result can be extended to any search
procedure in which the set of buyers who acquire information in any period is independent of the
past history of the procedure. For instance, a procedure with this property would have buyers 1
to 3, say, observe their values in period 1. If the procedure continue to a second period, then the
exact number and identity of the buyers who will be asked to acquire information period 2 will be
independent of v1, v2 and v3.13
3.3. An optimal mechanism when buyers are ex ante identical
When buyers have i.i.d. values and identical search costs, Eqs. (1) and (2) imply that the cutoffs in
the optimal search procedure are the same for all buyers. Therefore, the optimal search procedure
functions as follows: Eq. (2) determines a common cutoff value k. Buyers are then examined in
turn. Since one buyer is examined in every period we can use t to denote both the period and the
buyers who is examined in that period. The optimal search procedure stops as soon as vt ≥ k for
some t < N . If the procedure continues all the way to the last period, the good is allocated to the
buyer with the highest value.
When we translate this into a mechanism, we see that if a buyer does not submit an eligible bid
in the period in which he has acquired information, then he will not bid again until the last period.
Therefore in every period t < N , the seller losses nothing by allowing only buyer t, who has just
acquired information, to place an eligible bid: the mechanism is effectively equivalent to a series
of take-it-or-leave-it offers, such that in period t < N , buyer t who has just acquired information
is offered the good at price pt. If all buyers t < N reject their respective offers, the seller holds in
13A preliminary version of this paper with the computations of the reserve prices for this case is available from the
authors.
period N (after the last buyer acquires information) a second-price auction without reserve prices.
The take-it-or-leave-it offers are chosen such that buyer t < N will accepts the offer if and only
if vt ≥ k. Apart from the take-it-or-leave-it offers, the seller charges each buyer t an admission
fee, Tt, at the beginning of period 1, before any buyer has acquired information, but after the seller
determines the sequence at which the buyers will be invited to acquire information.
We state this formally in the following proposition. The formal proof is provided in Ap-
pendix B.
Proposition 2 In the sequential search model with i.i.d. values and identical costs of acquiring
information, there exists a sequence of take-it-or-leave-it offers followed by a second-price auction
held in period N such that the associated mechanism extracts the full surplus. The prices at which
the good is offered are decreasing in t.
Assume δ < 1. If buyers pay the admission fees in period 1, these fees are decreasing with t:
buyers who enter in later periods pay lower admission fees. On the other hand, if the admission
fees are paid in the period of entry just before the buyers acquire information, they are increasing
with t: buyers who enter later pay higher admission fees.
The fact that the reserve prices are decreasing has a straightforward economic explanation. For
a given value, a late buyer with value k who refuses to buy the good has a greater probability to
acquire the good in the second-price auction held at period N than does an early buyer with the
same value. Therefore, to induce this late buyer to accept the offer, the seller need to offer him a
lower price.
The proposition also shows that, if buyers pay their admission fee at the start of period 1, late
buyers have to pay a smaller admission fee than early buyers. This reflects the fact that absent (the
fully extracting) admission fees, a potential buyer would rather participate in the mechanism early
than late: late buyers have a smaller probability of winning the good, and in expectation they win
it later than early buyers. The ordering of admission fees is reversed when they are paid at the
period of entry: just before acquiring information about his valuation, a late entrant faces weak
competition from the buyers who entered before him, as they are known to have valuations smaller
than k.
Burguet (1996) studies a model similar in many ways to ours. In his model, a firm looks for a
long-term supplier. Potential suppliers differ in their costs, which Burguet assumes are i.i.d.. As
in our model, suppliers do not know their costs ex-ante; contrary to what happens in our model,
they learn their respective costs by supplying the product once. Similarly to this section, Burguet
assumes that the search for the lowest cost supplier is strictly sequential in the sense that there can
be only one supplier at any given period. He constructs two procurement mechanisms that imple-
ment the first-best search procedure. There are two important differences between his setup and
ours. First, the “good” in Burguet’s model is a long-term contract; while the search is conducted,
the tenure shortens and hence the value of the “good” to the supplier decreases. Second, the cost
of information acquisition is the cost of producing for one period. In terms of our model, this is
equivalent to assuming that the cost ci of information acquisition is negatively correlated with the
value vi of the good. This implies that the optimal search procedure does not satisfy the constant
reservation price property, and that it is not possible to implement the first-best procedure through
a sequence of take-it-or-leave-it offers.
3.4. A numerical example
The following example illustrates the advantage of determining the set of participants via optimal
search procedures rather than allowing all buyers to acquire information simultaneously before the
auction begins. We also use the example to illustrate how the seller determines the admission fees
that the two buyers are required to pay upfront before they acquire information. There are two
buyers whose values are independently drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Each buyer
needs to bear a cost c < 1/2 to learn his value and the discount factor is equal to 1.
In this case, Eq. (2) implies that
∫ 1
k
(v − k)dv = c, or
k = 1−
√
2c > 0. (5)
In the efficient search procedure, the seller invites one buyer, say buyer 1, to acquire information,
reimburses c, and asks him to report v1. Buyer 1 gets the good if v1 > k. Otherwise, buyer 2
acquires information, is reimbursed c, reports his value and the seller awards the good to the buyer
with the highest value. This procedure can be implemented with the reserve prices described in
Section (3.2), and yield a social surplus equal to∫ 1
k
(v − c)dv +
∫ k
0
(
−2c+
∫ v
0
v dv˜ +
∫ 1
v
v˜ dv˜
)
dv
=
2
3
− 2c+ 2c
√
2c
3
. (6)
We now contrast this mechanism with a “free entry” mechanism in which potential buyers can
acquire information simultaneously before the auction starts. By the efficiency principle, it suffices
to contrast the expected social surplus under the two mechanisms. Under “free entry,” there are
four possible cases (i) both buyers acquire information simultaneously, (ii) one buyer acquires
information and the other participates without information, (iii) only one buyer participates and he
acquires information, and (iv) both buyers participate without acquiring information.14
In case (i), the expected social surplus is∫∫
v1,v2
max [v1, v2] dv1 dv2 =
2
3
− 2c. (7)
In case (ii), the expected social surplus if the uninformed buyer wins is 1/2 − c (the uninformed
buyer still needs to spend c after winning because information acquisition is assumed to “produc-
tive”). Hence, the informed buyer will win if his value, v, exceeds 1/2 − c, while the uninformed
buyer will win otherwise. Hence, the expected social surplus is∫ 1
1
2
−c
v dv − c+
∫ 1
2
−c
0
(
1
2
− c
)
dv =
(
1
2
− c
)
(5− 2c)
4
. (8)
And, in cases (iii) and (iv), the good is arbitrarily given to one buyer and c is spent once. The
expected social surplus is ∫ 1
0
vdv − c = 1
2
− c. (9)
14Since c < 1/2, there does not exist an equilibrium in which both buyers to stay out. Moreover, since information
acquisition is productive, there also does not exist an equilibrium in which one buyer stays out and the other participates
without acquiring information.
Clearly, the expected surplus in Eq. (6) exceeds the expected surplus in Eq. (7). Moreover,
since c < 1/2, the expected surplus in Eq. (8) exceeds the expected surplus in Eq. (9). However,
for all c < 1/2,
2
3
− 2c+ 2c
√
2c
3
>
(
1
2
− c
)
(5− 2c)
4
.
Hence, the expected surplus under the efficient search mechanism exceeds the expected surplus
under a “free entry” mechanism for all c < 1/2.
Finally, we use the example to show that when δ = 1, the admission fees paid by the two
bidders are equal to each other if paid in period 1. To this end, note since there are only two buyers
whose values are drawn independently from a uniform distribution on [0, 1], and since the discount
factor is equal to 1, Eq. (3) implies the seller chooses the reserve price
p = k −
∫ k
0
(k − v)dv.
Recall that buyer 1 buys the good immediately at price p if v1 > k, but buys it in period 2 at
price v2 if v2 < v1 < k. Therefore, the expected payoff of buyer 1 after he pays his admission fee,
but before he incurs the cost c and learns v1, is
U1 =
∫ 1
k
(v1 − p)dv1 +
∫ k
0
∫ v1
0
(v1 − v2)dv2dv1 − c
=
∫ 1
k
(
v1 − k +
∫ k
0
(k − v2)dv2
)
dv1 +
∫ k
0
∫ v1
0
(v1 − v2)dv2dv1 − c
=
∫ 1
k
(
v1 − k −
∫ k
0
(v1 − k)dv2 +
∫ k
0
(v1 − v2)dv2
)
dv1
+
∫ k
0
∫ v1
0
(v1 − v2)dv2dv1 − c
=
∫ 1
k
(v1 − k)(1− k)dv1
+
[∫ k
0
∫ v1
0
(v1 − v2)dv2dv1 +
∫ 1
k
∫ k
0
(v1 − v2)dv2dv1
]
− c.
Similarly, the expected payoff of buyer 2 at the beginning of period 2 before he incurs the cost c
and learns v2 is given by
U2 =
∫ k
0
∫ v
0
(v1 − v2)dv2
k
dv1 +
∫ 1
k
∫ k
0
(v1 − v2)dv2
k
dv1 − c.
The admission fees that the seller charges the two buyer at the beginning of period 1 are equal
to their respective expected payoffs and given by T1 = U1 and T2 = kU2 (buyer 2 enjoys U2 only
if v1 < k, i.e., with probability k). Hence,
T1 − T2 =
∫ 1
k
(v1 − k)(1− k)dv1 − c (1− k)
= (1− k)
[∫ 1
k
(v1 − k)dv1 − c
]
= 0,
where the last equality follows from the definition of k.
4. Implementing the first-best in the general case
In this section we turn to the general case in which the buyers’ values are possibly correlated
and the first-best search procedure could be stochastic with parallel search. That is, in any given
period, it may be optimal for several buyers to acquire information, and the set of buyers that
should become informed may depend on the information acquired so far.15 We will show that no
matter how the first-best procedure looks, the seller can implement it with a revelation mechanism.
The revelation mechanism must satisfy incentive compatibility and individual rationality con-
straints: there must be an equilibrium of the mechanism in which all buyers announce their true
values, and their expected payoffs from participation must all be nonnegative. This formulation
assumes that the buyers observe previous announcements before announcing their own values.
Assumption 1 Any profile (vi)i∈I , with vi ∈ Vi for all i ∈ I , occurs with a positive prior proba-
bility (if types are discrete) or a positive density (if types are continuous).
Assumption 1 holds trivially when the buyers’ values are independent. When buyers’ values
are correlated, this assumption ensures that there are no cases in which a buyer may find himself
in a situation where he knows for sure that some of the buyers who have announced their values
before him has lied. To illustrate, suppose that if v1 = 3 then it is impossible that v2 = 7. Now if
v2 = 7 and buyer 2 hears buyer 1 reporting v1 = 3, then buyer 2 knows that buyer 1 has lied about
his value. This means that it would be impossible to ensure that buyer 2 would report his value
truthfully given that buyer 2 already knows that we are now off-the-equilibrium path. In other
words, we show in the next theorem that there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which all
15In Appendix D we prove that a first-best search procedure exists.
buyers make truthful reports. We do so by showing that given buyer i’s hypothesis that all buyers
who already reported their values were truthful and given his hypothesis that all future buyers will
also be truthful, buyer i will have an incentive to also be truthful. Assumption 1 rules out the
possibility of events that can contradict buyer i’s hypotheses. In Remark 3 below we will show
that Assumption 1 can be replaced with a weaker assumption.
Theorem 1 Given Assumption 1, there exists an incentive feasible mechanism that implements any
first-best search procedure.
Proof. Consider a first-best search procedure and recall that whenever this procedure stops, the
good is allocated to the informed buyer with the highest known value. We build upon the first-best
search procedure the following direct revelation mechanism. If the mechanism reaches period t,
the seller asks the buyers i ∈ It(v̂t−1) to acquire information, where v̂t−1 is the profile of values
that were announced in previous periods.16 Once buyers in the set It(v̂t−1) become informed, each
of them is asked to independently announce his value and these announcements are made public.
Given his report vˆi, buyer i is committed to a payment scheme which we will specify shortly. The
set It is defined as in the first-best search procedure for all t and the seller acts as if all informed
buyers have announced their true values, i.e., as if v̂t−1 = vt−1. In equilibrium, all informed buyers
will indeed announce their true values.
Once the mechanism stops, the good is allocated to the informed buyer whose announced
value was highest. The winner then pays the search costs incurred by all buyers who acquired
information after he did while all the losing buyers pay a similar amount minus the announced
16When t = 1 there is no profile of previously observed values, so v0 = (∅, ∅, . . . , ∅).
value of the winner. In addition, each buyer pays an admission fee equal to his expected payoff
from participation.
This mechanism implements the first-best search procedure if all informed buyers announce
their values truthfully. We use the recursion hypothesis that all buyers have announced their true
values in all previous periods, and prove that buyers in It(v̂t−1) will do the same.
To this end, consider any first-best search procedure, and let qi(s, v̂i | v̂t−1, vi) denote the
probability that buyer i who acquires information in period t gets the good in period s ≥ t if
his announced value in period t is v̂i, given that the profile of values that were announced up
to and including period t − 1 is v̂t−1 and given that his own true value is vi. In addition, let
Z−it(v̂i | v̂t−1, vi) be the aggregate discounted expected utility that all buyers but i derive from
consuming the good if buyer i’s announcement in period t is v̂i, and let C−it(v̂i | v̂t−1, vi) be the
associated aggregate discounted cost that all buyers but i incur when they acquiring information in
period t and all subsequent periods.17 Let us also define
δtt := 1, δ
s+1
t := δ
s
tδs, s = t, t+ 1, . . . , N.
Then, the discounted expected utility of buyer i when he announces in period t that his value is
v̂i is
vi
∞∑
s=t
δstqi(s, v̂i | v̂t−1, vi) + Z−it(v̂i | v̂t−1, vi)− C−it(v̂i | v̂t−1, vi)− ci. (10)
This expression is equal to the expected surplus that the seller would get in the first-best search
procedure given vt−1 by deciding to follow from period t onward the policy that he would have
17The probability qi(s, v̂i | v̂t−1, vi), as well as the expressions Z−it(v̂i | v̂t−1, vi) and C−it(v̂i | v̂t−1, vi) are
well-defined. See Appendix D for details.
followed had buyer i’s value been v̂i instead of vi. By revealed preferences, this expression is
maximized at v̂i = vi. That is, buyer ı´’s optimal strategy is to announce his true value. Note that
Assumption 1 is crucial for the revealed preferences argument: if Assumption 1 fails, then it is
possible that vt−1 is incompatible with vi in which case buyer i realizes that at least one buyer has
already misreported his value before period t, and he need not maximize his expected value by
making a truthful report.
Several remarks about Theorem 1 are in order.
Remark 1 The mechanism that we constructed in the proof of Theorem 1 is a Groves-like mech-
anism. The idea is to structure the payment of each informed buyer in such a way that the buyer’s
problem coincides with the seller’s problem in the first-best search problem. Each buyer then
wishes to make a truthful report in order to allow the seller to maximize the surplus. Note however
from Eq. (10) that a buyer’s expected utility does depend on his belief about the values of future
buyers who are yet uninformed. Hence, truth telling is not a dominant strategy equilibrium. While
this mechanism is efficient, it obviously does a poor job in extracting the buyers’ surplus ex post.
In fact, each one of the buyers who do not get the good receives a payment equal to the value of the
buyer who does get the good (minus the cost of search incurred by all other buyers who acquired
information either at the same time or after). However, given that the mechanism implements the
first-best search procedure, the efficiency principle ensures that the seller obtains a payoff equal to
the entire increase in social surplus generated by the optimal search.
Remark 2 The proof of Theorem 1 does not depend on the assumption that buyers learn their
values as soon as they spend the cost ci. Hence, the result can be easily generalized to the case
where it takes more than one period for buyers to discover their values or if this time would differ
across different buyers.18
Remark 3 The role of Assumption 1 is to ensure that no bidder knows that the game has gone
off the equilibrium path. We could weaken this assumption by making the following assumption
instead:
Assumption 1’ If buyer i belongs to the set It of buyers who are invited to enter the mechanism at
period t and his realized value is vi, and if (I1, ..., It−1) is the sequence of buyers who were invited
to enter in previous periods, then there exists a profile vt−1 of realized values of these earlier
entrants such that (vt−1; vi) has a positive probability (with discrete types) or positive density
(with continuous types) and the first-best search procedure given vt−1 asks buyers in It to enter in
period t.
Roughly speaking, Assumption 1’ ensures that a buyer cannot infer only on the basis of his
place in the sequence that some other buyer ahead of him in the sequence must have lied. Given
this assumption, consider the following modified mechanism: the seller does not make the bidders’
announcements public, so when a buyer is called upon to acquire information and announce his
type he only knows his place in the sequence but not the announcements of previous buyers. If the
seller hears a series of announcements that are obviously false (the vector of announced values is
not feasible), he penalizes heavily all buyers who have already made announcements. Otherwise,
the payments are exactly as before. With this modification, the expected discounted payoff of
18This is also true for Theorem 2.
each buyer i is the expectation of the expression in Eq. (10), conditional on the fact that the buyer
is called in period t. Given the modified expected payoffs, no buyer would have an incentive to
lie about his value if he believes that the others buyers are truthful. By lying, a buyer could not
induce other buyers to lie since the announcement are not made public and since Assumption 1’
ensures that buyers cannot be sure that others must have lied just on the basis of their place in the
sequence. Furthermore, given Assumption 1’, a lying buyer faces a positive probability of inducing
an infeasible vector of announcements in which case he is heavily penalized.
Remark 4 As noted above, Assumption 1 always holds if buyers’ values are stochastically in-
dependent. Hence, in the independent values case, it is always possible to find a mechanism that
implements the first-best search procedure. In this mechanism, buyer i need not wait until the
good is allocated to some buyer before making (or receiving) payments. To see why, note that if
the buyers’ values are stochastically independent then
Z−it(v̂i | v̂t−1, vi) = Z−it(v̂i | v̂t−1), ∀i ∈ I,
and
C−it(v̂i | v̂t−1, vi) = C−it(v̂i | v̂t−1), ∀i ∈ I.
That is, the aggregate discounted expected utility that all buyers but i derive from consuming the
good and the associated aggregate discounted cost of information acquisition that all buyers but
i incur in period t and onward, depend only on buyer i’s announcement but not on buyer i’s true
value. Hence, the seller can charge each buyer the amount C−it(v̂i | v̂t−1, vi)− Z−it(v̂i | v̂t−1, vi)
as soon as buyer i makes his announcement. With this payment, buyer i’s expected payoff will be
as in Eq. (10) and buyer i will have an incentive to announce his true value.
Remark 5 In the independent values case, the probability that buyer i who acquires information
in period t gets the good in period s ≥ t if his announced value in period t is v̂i, is
qi(s, v̂i | v̂t−1, vi) = qi(s, v̂i | v̂t−1), ∀i ∈ I.
That is, this probability depends only on buyer i announcement but not on his true value. Since in
equilibrium all buyers announce their true values, the discounted probability that buyer i will get
the good when the buyer learns in period t that is value is vi is therefore
Qit(vi | vt−1) =
∞∑
s=t
δstqi(s, vi | vt−1).
Since the mechanism implements the first-best search procedure, Qit(vi | vt−1) is also the dis-
counted probability that buyer i gets the good in the first-best search procedure when he learns in
period t that his value is vi and given that the vector of values of all buyers who have learned their
values up to and including period t is vt−1.
It is possible to show the following proposition (see Appendix C for a proof):
Proposition 3 Qit(vi | vt−1) is (weakly) monotone increasing in vi for any t = 1, 2, ... and any
informed buyer i.
This proposition has an important consequence for the type of mechanism that can be imple-
mented. The payment of buyer i can then take the form∫ v′i
vmini
∂Qit(z | vt−1)
∂z
zdz,
where vmini is the minimum vi in Vi and v
′
i is his announcement.
19 Indeed, when his type is vi,
buyer i chooses his announcement v′i so as to maximize
viQit(v
′
i | vt−1)−
∫ v′i
vmini
∂Qit(z | vt−1)
∂z
zdz
= viQit(vi | vt−1)−
∫ vi
vmini
∂Qit(z | vt−1)
∂z
zdz
+
∫ v′i
vi
(vi − z)∂Qit(z | v
t−1)
∂z
dz
When Qit is monotone, truth-telling maximizes buyer i’s utility.20
Remark 6 Unlike the independent values case, when the buyers’ values are not independent, the
discounted probability that buyer i would get the good in an optimal search procedure need not be
19This implicitly assumes that Vi is an interval. Only technical details of no importance change if it is not.
20Of course, the fact thatQit is monotone is only necessary for enabling us to build mechanisms where the payment
of bidder i does not depend on future bids. As Theorem 1 shows, we can implement the first best even when this
assumption does not hold.
increasing with his value. To see that, consider a model with two ex ante identical buyers, 1 and
2. Suppose that the discount factor is 1 and the cost of acquiring information is c ∈ [1, 3]. The
buyers’ values, v1 and v2, belong to the set {1, 3, 10}, and their joint distribution is described by
the following table:
v2
1 3 10
1 0.28 0.01 0.01
v1 3 0.01 0.18 0.16
10 0.01 0.16 0.18
For instance, Pr(v1 = 3, v2 = 10) = 0.16. In an optimal search procedure, at least one buyer, say
buyer 1, should acquire information in period 1, since his expected value is
0.3× 1 + 0.35× 3 + 0.35× 10 = 4.85,
while the cost of acquiring information is at most 3. Obviously, if v1 = 10, then the mechanism
should stop and buyer 1 should get the good. If v1 = 1, then buyer 2’s expected value, conditional
on v1 = 1, is
0.28
0.3
× 1 + 0.01
0.3
× 3 + 0.01
0.3
× 10 ≈ 1.37.
Since c ≥ 1, continuation generates an expected surplus of at most 0.37; hence, it is again optimal
to stop the mechanism and give the good to buyer 1. But, v1 = 3, then buyer 2’s expected value,
conditional on v1 = 3, is
0.01
0.35
× 1 + 0.18
0.35
× 3 + 0.16
0.35
× 10 = 6.2.
Since c ≤ 3, continuation generates an expected surplus of at least 3.2. Hence, it is now efficient
to ask buyer 2 to also acquire information rather than give the good immediately to buyer 1. The
good is then allocated to the buyer with the highest value (in case of a tie the good is given to one
of the buyers at random). Hence, in an optimal search procedure, buyer 1 gets the good for sure if
v1 ∈ {1, 10}, but if v1 = 3, he gets it for sure only when v2 = 1 and with some probability when
v2 = 3, but does not get it at all when v2 = 10.
5. The incentive to acquire information
Thus far we assumed that information acquisition by each buyer is contractible. That is, a court
can verify whether a buyer has failed to acquire information when being asked by the seller and can
impose a large penalty on the buyer in this cases. In this section we will show that this assumption is
not needed: the mechanism that we constructed in Section 4 provides buyers with proper incentives
to acquire information.21
In general, when information acquisition is not contractible, buyers might benefit from staying
uninformed until they actually win the good (in which case they must, by assumption, acquire
information before consuming the good). Being uninformed means that the buyers may not get
the good when they should or get it when they should not. Nonetheless, buyers may benefit from
staying uninformed since then they can save the cost of information acquisition in all the cases
in which they fail to win the good.22 In the next theorem we show however that the mechanism
that we constructed in Section 4 solves this incentive problem. Intuitively, the transfers in this
mechanism are designed such that the expected payoff of each buyer coincides with the seller’s
expected surplus. Since the seller has an incentive to acquire information in the optimal search
21We continue to assume however that the seller can prevent buyers from acquiring information before they agree
to participate in the mechanism. What we show then is that it is not necessary to also assume that the seller can force
buyers to acquire information once they agree to participate and are instructed to learn their values. The problem that
we consider in this section differs therefore from that in the literature on precontractual information acquisition in
mechanism design (see Cre´mer and Khalil (1992), Cre´mer, Khalil and Rochet (1998a,b), and Lewis and Sappington
(1997)) where an agent may learn his type before accepting the principal’s contract.
22This consideration, which arises due to the fact that the seller faces multiple potential buyers, is completely absent
in the literature on precontractual information acquisition mentioned above which considered single agent models.
procedure, so will each of the buyers.
Theorem 2 The revelation mechanism characterized in Section 4 provides each buyer with proper
incentives to acquire information.
Proof. We prove that the “obedient” strategy, acquiring information and reporting it truthfully, is a
perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game generated by the mechanism. In order to do so, we
adapt the proof of Theorem 1 to the problem of information acquisition. To this end, let F (v |v̂t−1)
be the joint probability distribution of the values of all buyers (informed and uninformed) condi-
tional on the information profile at the end of period t − 1: F (v |v̂t−1) is the best estimate of
buyers’ values as of the end of period t− 1.
Consider buyer i who is asked by the seller to acquire information in period t. Given the
mechanism that was constructed in Theorem 1, the discounted expected utility of buyer i if he
does not acquire information in period t and makes the report v̂i is
Ui =
∫
V
[
(vi − ci)
∞∑
s=t
δstqi(s, v̂i | v̂t−1, vi)
+Z−it(v̂i | v̂t−1, vi)− C−it(v̂i | v̂t−1, vi)
]
dF (v |v̂t−1),
where V := ×i∈IVi is the set of all possible profiles (states of nature), and the functions Z−it
and C−it have been defined in the proof of Theorem 1. Indeed, when buyer i gets the good, he
needs to spend the cost ci before consuming it. Buyer i gets the good in period s with probability∫
V
qi(s, v̂i | v̂t−1, vi)dF (v |v̂t−1). The rest of the expression shows his expected transfers from the
seller.
The report v̂i by buyer i generates a search procedure which is a feasible solution of the search
problem. The expected surplus associated with this solution is exactly equal to Ui. Because this
solution is (at least weakly) dominated by the optimal search procedure, and since the optimal
search procedure generates a surplus to the seller equals to the utility of buyer i if he follows the
obedient strategy, Ui is smaller than the utility of the buyer if he follows that strategy. Hence, the
obedient strategy is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism.
6. Conclusion
This paper has characterize optimal selling mechanisms when buyers do not know their values
at the outset and must incur a cost in order to learn these values. Unlike most of the literature
on auctions with endogenous entry which assumes that all interested bidders acquire information
simultaneously before the auction begins, we made the decision on who will acquire information
and at what stage an integral part of the seller’s problem. We showed that it is possible to construct
a mechanism that leads to a full extraction of surplus: under this mechanism, the seller does as
well as if he could have fully controlled the buyers’ acquisition of information and learned their
values at the same time as they do. Furthermore, our proofs are constructive, in the sense that
they show how to build the optimal mechanism once the optimal search procedure (that specifies
who should acquire information in which period and who gets the good, based on the information
that has already been acquired) has been identified. In some special cases in which the optimal
search procedure is known, we have identified explicitly an optimal mechanism. In more general
cases, the properties of the optimal search procedure may not yet be known (the optimal search
could be parallel and may depend on the history of the search up to that point). However, we
wish to stress that computing the optimal search procedure is a problem for Operations Research
specialists, not economists. Our paper focuses on the incentive issues that arise due to the fact that
buyers may wish to avoid the cost of information acquisition and remain uninformed about their
values, and may wish to misreport their private information once they do acquire information. Our
main result is that once the operations research problem is solved, it is possible to implement the
optimal search procedure with an incentive feasible mechanism.
Our results could be generalized in a number of dimensions. For instance, we have assumed
that the cost of information acquisition had to be incurred before consumption can take place.
This implies that there is no need to consider the possibility of selling the good to an uninformed
buyer. The theory would go through basically unchanged if we allowed for sale to an uninformed
buyer. We have also assumed that the buyers’ participation constraints are ex ante: buyers agree
to participate before they become informed. If we replace this constraint by interim participation
constraints, then while it is still true that the mechanism that was constructed in Theorem 1 will
implement the first-best search procedure, this mechanism will no longer enable the seller to extract
the full surplus from each buyer. In Cre´mer, Spiegel, and Zheng (2007), we characterized the
seller’s optimal mechanisms in that case.23 We show that it is seller-optimal to find a winner of the
good via a search procedure that maximizes the expected value of the virtual utility of the trade.
Hence, the seller-optimal search procedure is usually socially inefficient and will involve too few
participants, too long search conditional on the same set of participants, and inefficient sequence
of entry.
Our paper also shares with the rest of the literature the assumption that the cis are known to
the seller; in some circumstances this might be an unreasonable assumption - it is probably more
realistic to think that in general both the seller and the bidder have private information that would
be useful to estimate the costs of information acquisition. We feel that there is interesting work to
be done in trying to understand the consequences of less stringent assumptions on this topic. In
particular, it could be that some less sophisticated mechanisms are less sensitive to bad information
about these costs.
23See footnote 2.
Appendices
A. Proof of Proposition 1
To prove the proposition, we begin with the following lemma:
Lemma A.1 The reserve prices defined by Eq. (3) and (4) satisfy pti < kt+1 for all i < N and all
t = i, . . . , N − 1.
Proof. Consider pN−1i first. The right-hand side of Eq. (3) is positive since kN > 0. Hence
pN−1i < kN . In general, if p
t+1
i < kt+2 (∀t = i+1, . . . , N−1), then pt+1i < kt+1 since kt+2 ≤ kt+1;
hence the right-hand side of Eq. (4) is positive, implying that pti < kt+1. The lemma therefore
follows by induction.
It now suffices to prove the following claim for all t = 1, . . . , N .
Claim A.1 The strategy profile defined below constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the
continuation game of the Weitzman auctions starting from period t: In every period t < N , every
informed buyer i submits an eligible bid if and only if vi ≥ kt+1 and, if he does submit an eligible
bid, his bid is equal to vi; in the final period N , every buyer bids his true value.
In every period t, Lemma A.1 implies that a buyer’s minimum eligible bid is below the cutoff
kt+1. Thus, the strategy profile described above is well-defined. Our task is to prove that the profile
constitutes an equilibrium.
If the mechanism reaches the final period N then we have a simple second-price auction with
private values. Hence it is a dominant strategy for each buyer to submit a bid equal to his value.
Thus, the claim is true for period N . For future reference, let us calculate a buyer i’s expected
payoff at the beginning of period N , given his value vi:
BNi (vi) =
∫ vi
0
(
vi − vN−i
)
dHN−i(v
N
−i), (A.1)
where HN−i(v
N
−i) :=
FN−i(v
N
−i)
FN−1−i (kN )
is the cumulative distribution function of vN−i conditional on it being
less than kN (otherwise at least one of the buyers would have submitted an eligible bid before
period N in which case the mechanism would not have reached period N ).
For any t = 1, . . . , N−1, assume that the claim is true for all periods t′ > t; we shall complete
the proof by demonstrating the claim for period t. Hence consider period t, when the buyers
1, . . . , t are already informed. If any of them submits an eligible bid in this period, then the good is
sold via a second-price auction and the mechanism ends. Thus, if an informed buyer contemplates
submitting an eligible bid in period t, his problem is essentially equivalent to a bidder’s problem in
a second-price auction with bidder-specific reserve prices; hence it is a dominant strategy for this
buyer to bid his true value .
The remaining question for a buyer in period t is whether to submit an eligible bid or not, given
the equilibrium hypothesis that other buyers are truthful. Pick any such buyer i. If buyer i submits
an eligible bid, then he bids his true value vi, as previously observed. When vi ≥ kt+1, buyer i
wins if either no one else submits an eligible bid (kt+1 > vt−i by the equilibrium hypothesis) or
the highest eligible bid from other buyers is below his bid vi (kt+1 ≤ vt−i < vi by the equilibrium
hypothesis). In the first case, buyer i pays pti, and in the second case he pays v
t
−i. Therefore,
buyer i’s expected payoff if he submits an eligible bid in period t is:
Bti(vi) =

∫ kt+1
0
[vi − pti] dH t−i(vt−i)
+
∫ vi
kt+1
[
vi − vt−i
]
dH t−i(v
t
−i)
if vi ≥ kt+1,
∫ kt+1
0
[vi − pti] dH t−i(vt−i) if vi < kt+1.
(A.2)
Suppose that buyer i does not submit an eligible bid in period t. We shall calculate his expected
payoff N ti (vi) from this action. If someone else submits an eligible bid in this period, i gets zero
payoff; otherwise, the mechanism continues to period t + 1 and buyer i gets his optimal expected
payoff in the continuation game starting at period t + 1, given his equilibrium hypothesis. By the
induction hypothesis, the strategy profile defined in our claim constitutes an equilibrium in this
continuation game, which also fits his equilibrium hypothesis. Thus, conditional on the event that
the mechanism continues to period t + 1, buyer i’s expected payoff is equal to the one generated
by the scenario that all buyers, including buyer i, will abide to this equilibrium starting from
period t+ 1. In this scenario, buyer i will either submit an eligible bid in the first period t′ among
{t + 1, . . . , N} such that his value is at least kt′+1 or, if such t′ does not exist, submit a bid in the
final period. Thus, when vi ≥ kt+1, buyer iwill submit a bid in period t+1 because k1 ≥ . . . ≥ kN
implies that vi ≥ kt+2. By the equilibrium hypothesis, the probability of reaching period t+1 from
period t is H t−i(kt+1); conditional on reaching period t+ 1, buyer i’s expected payoff is B
t+1
i (vi),
defined by Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2). Thus,
vi ≥ kt+1 =⇒ N ti (vi) = δtH t−i(kt+1)Bt+1i (vi) = δt
F t−i(kt+1)
F t−1−i (kt)
Bt+1i (vi).
In general, buyer i can choose to submit an eligible bid in period t + 1 if he does not do so in
period t; thus, for all vi,
N ti (vi) ≥ δtH t−i(kt+1)Bt+1i (vi) = δt
F t−i(kt+1)
F t−1−i (kt)
Bt+1i (vi).
Combining these two facts, we know that the difference in buyer i’s expected payoff between
submitting an eligible bid in period t and not submitting such a bid is
Bti(vi)−N ti (vi)
 =
B˜ti (vi)−δtB˜t+1i (vi)
F t−1−i (kt)
if vi ≥ kt+1,
≤ B˜ti (vi)−δtB˜t+1i (vi)
F t−1−i (kt)
if vi < kt+1,
(A.3)
where B˜ti(vi) := F
t−1
−i (kt)B
t
i(vi). Note that B˜
t
i is continuous and differentiable at kt+1.
We are now ready to verify that it is optimal for buyer i to follow the equilibrium strategy in
period t, i.e., submit an eligible bid if and only if vi ≥ kt+1. It suffices to show thatBti(vi) ≥ N ti (vi)
if and only if vi ≥ kt+1. By (A.3), we need only to prove that B˜ti(vi)− δtB˜t+1i (vi) is nonnegative
for all vi > kt+1, nonpositive for all vi < kt+1, and is zero at vi = kt+1. The reserve prices pti,
defined in Eq. (3) and (4), are computed so that
B˜ti(kt+1) = δtB˜
t+1
i (kt+1).
Thus, we need only to show that B˜ti(vi)− δtB˜t+1i (vi) is monotone nondecreasing in vi. Hence we
differentiate this function using Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) (in case of t = N − 1, let kN+1 := −∞):
d
dvi
(
B˜ti(vi)− δtB˜t+1i (vi)
)
=

F t−i(vi)− δtF t+1−i (vi) if vi > kt+1,
F t−i(kt+1)− δtF t+1−i (vi) if kt+2 < vi < kt+1,
F t−i(kt+1)− δtF t+1−i (kt+2) if vi < kt+2.
(A.4)
Since the values are independently distributed across buyers
F t+1−i (vi) = F
t
−i(vi)× Ft+1(vi).
Thus, every branch of the right-hand side of Eq. (A.4) is positive. As previously noted, B˜ti is
continuous at the point kt+1 for all t, hence B˜ti − δtB˜t+1i is continuous at the boundary of the
branches. It follows that this function is strictly increasing, as desired. Therefore, the claim is true
for all periods t = 1, . . . , N by induction. This proves the proposition.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
The sequence of take-it-or-leave-it-offers is decreasing Let F be the common distribution of
types of buyers. Eqs. (1) and (2) imply that the cutoff in all periods is the same and defined
implicitly by ∫ v
k
(v − k)dF (v)− c = (1− δ) k
δ
, (B.5)
Eq. (4) implies that, for all t,∫ k
0
(k − pt) dF (v)t−1 = δ
∫ k
0
(k − pt+1) dF (v)t
=⇒ k − pt = δ (k − pt+1)F (k).
By Eqs. (1) and (2), F (k) < 1, and therefore pt > pt+1.
Admission fees We now turn to the second part of the proposition and begin by proving that the
sequence of admission fees, as seen from the time of entry, is increasing.
By Eq. (3), remembering that kt = k for all t, we have
k − pN−1 = δ
∫ k
0
(k − v′)d(F (v
′)N−1)
F (k)N−2
. (B.6)
With Eq. (4) and kt = kt+1 = k this implies for all m
k − pN−m = δ(k − pN−m+1)F (k) = δm−1(k − pN−1)F (k)m−1
= δm
∫ k
0
(k − v′)d(F (v
′)N−1)
F (k)N−2
F (k)m−1 = δm
∫ k
0
(k − v′)d(F (v
′)N−1)
F (k)N−m−1
. (B.7)
Let us call Ut the expected payoff of buyer t measured from the beginning of period t, absent entry
fee. Because the participation constraint is binding, this will be equal to his entry fee, if paid at
the same date. Then, letting the dummy v represent the valuation of agent N and v′ the maximum
valuation of buyers 1, . . . , N − 1 we have
UN + c =
∫ k
0
∫ v
0
(v − v′)dF (v
′)N−1
F (k)N−1
dF (v) +
∫ 1
k
∫ k
0
(v − v′)dF (v
′)N−1
F (k)N−1
dF (v) (B.8)
>
∫ 1
k
∫ k
0
(v − v′)dF (v
′)N−1
F (k)N−1
dF (v)
>
∫ 1
k
[∫ k
0
(v − k)dF (v
′)N−1
F (k)N−1
]
dF (v) =
∫ 1
k
(v − k)dF (v). (B.9)
Using (B.7), we have for any m = 1, . . . , N − 1,∫ 1
k
(v − pN−m)dF (v) =
∫ 1
k
[
v − k + δm
∫ k
0
(k − v′)d(F (v
′)N−1)
F (k)N−m−1
]
dF (v)
=
∫ 1
k
[
(v − k)
(
1− δm
∫ k
0
d(F (v′)N−1)
F (k)N−m−1
)
+ δm
∫ k
0
(v − v′)d(F (v
′)N−1)
F (k)N−m−1
]
dF (v)
=
∫ 1
k
[
(v − k)(1− δmF (k)m) + δm
∫ k
0
(v − v′)d(F (v
′)N−1)
F (k)N−m−1
]
dF (v). (B.10)
Now, using Eqs. (B.8) and (B.10), and representing UN−m + c as the sum of the expected payoff
of buyer N −m in period N −m and of the expected payoff in the last period, we obtain
UN−m + c =
∫ 1
k
(v − pN−m)dF (v) + δm
∫ k
0
∫ v
0
(v − v′)d(F (v
′)N−1)
F (k)N−m−1
dF (v)
=
∫ 1
k
(v − k)(1− δmF (k)m)dF (v) + δmF (k)m(UN + c)
=
∫ 1
k
(
(v − k)(1− δmF (k)m) + δm
∫ k
0
(v − v′)d(F (v
′)N−1)
F (k)N−m−1
)
dF (v)
+ δm
∫ k
0
∫ v
0
(v − v′)d(F (v
′)N−1)
F (k)N−m−1
dF (v)
= (1− δmF (k)m)
∫ 1
k
(v − k)dF (v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<UN+c by (B.9)
+δmF (k)m(UN + c).
As δmF (k)m is a strictly decreasing function of m, we have U1 + c < U2 + c < . . . < UN + c, and
therefore U1 < U2 < . . . < UN .
We now turn to the comparison of entry fees when they are paid in period 1. Absent admis-
sion fees, bidder t’s period-1 discounted expected surplus is U0t := δ
t−1F (k)t−1Ut. From the
computations above and Eq. (B.5), we have
UN−m − δmF (k)mUN = (1− δmF (k)m)
(∫ 1
k
(v − k)dF (v)− c
)
= (1− δmF (k)m)
(
1
δ
− 1
)
k.
Hence,
U0N−m − U0N = (δF (k))N−m−1 (1− δmF (k)m)
(
1
δ
− 1
)
k.
Thus, an earlier entrant has a greater period-1 surplus than bidder N unless δ = 1, and because
(δF (k))N−m−1 (1− δmF (k)m) increases with m, U0N−m −U0N also increases in m (unless δ = 1).
C. Proof of Proposition 3
From the viewpoint of an observer who knows vi and vt−1, the expected aggregate surplus gener-
ated by the search procedure is
viQit(vi | vt−1) + Z−it(vi | vt−1)− Cit(vi | vt−1).
Now, assume that having observed vi and vt−1, the seller decides to follow the policy that he would
have followed had buyer i’s value been v′i instead of vi. Since buyers’ values are independent,
the aggregate expected utility that other buyers derive from consuming the good as well as the
expected future aggregate cost of information acquisition becomeZ−it(v′i | vt−1) andCit(v′i | vt−1)
respectively: they depend only on the policy followed by the seller, but not on the actual value of
buyer i. The probability that buyer i would obtain the good in period s becomes Qit(v′i | vt−1)
(again since values are independent) and the expected aggregate surplus is
viQit(v
′
i | vt−1) + Z−it(v′i | vt−1)− Cit(v′i | vt−1).
By revealed preference, the expected aggregate surplus must be greater if the “right” policy is
chosen:
viQit(vi | vt−1) + Z−it(vi | vt−1)− Cit(vi | vt−1)
≥ viQit(v′i | vt−1) + Z−it(v′i | vt−1)− Cit(v′i | vt−1).
The same inequality must also hold if the roles of vi and v′i are inverted:
v′iQit(v
′
i | vt−1) + Z−it(v′i | vt−1)− Cit(v′i | vt−1)
≥ v′iQit(vi | vt−1) + Z−it(vi | vt−1)− Cit(vi | vt−1).
Adding these two inequalities and simplifying we obtain
(vi − v′i)
(
Qit(vi | vt−1)−Qit(v′i | vt−1)
) ≥ 0.
Assuming, without loss of generality, that vi > v′i, the result follows.
D. A formal definition of search procedures and a proof that
first-best search procedure exists
The proof of Theorem 1 uses constructs such as “the probability with which a bidder wins the
good in period s given his report in period t and his true value.” In this appendix we clarify
the measurability requirement in the definition of search procedure in order to ensure that these
constructs are well-defined once a search procedure is given.
Recall that I is a finite set of potential buyers and let 2I denote the set of all subsets of I . For
every i ∈ I , let Vi ⊂ R be the set of possible values of i. Let V := ×i∈IVi. An element of V
is written as v = (vi)i∈I , with vi ∈ Vi. For any J ⊂ I and any v ∈ V , let vJ := (vi)i∈J and
v−J := (vi)i 6∈J .
Endow V with a probability measure (generated by the Borel sets), and let F denote the induced
distribution function. Denote F for this measure space. Since I is finite, the F-measurability of
functions from V to 2I is well-defined.
Definition: A search procedure is a sequence (ψt)∞t=1 of functions ψt : V → 2I such that each ψt
is F-measurable and the following condition, stated recursively, is satisfied:
1. ψ1 is constant on V . Denote I1 := ψ1. Note that I1 is F-measurable.
2. For any t = 1, 2, . . ., if It : V → 2I is well-defined and F-measurable, then for any
v, v′ ∈ V , if It(v) = It(v′) and vIt(v) = v′It(v′), then ψt+1(v) = ψt+1(v′) ⊆ I \ It(v).
Denote It+1(v) := It(v) ∪ ψt+1(v) for all v ∈ V . Note that It+1 is F-measurable because
both It and ψt+1 are so.
The interpretation of the definition is as follows. Let the state of the nature be given by v. ψ1(v)
is the set of buyers who become informed in period 1. Part 1 of the definition implies that ψ1(v)
is predetermined independently of v, and I1(v) denotes this set. ψ2(v) is the set of uninformed
buyers who become informed in period 2. Part 2 implies two requirements: (i) ψ2(v) should be a
subset of I \ I1(v), which is the set of potential buyers who have not been informed in period 1,
and (ii) ψ2(v) can vary only with the realized values vI1(v) of those who have been informed in
period 1. I2(v) then denotes the set of buyers who are informed up to the end of period 2. The
search ends at the end of period t if and only if ψt(v) 6= ∅ and ψt′(v) = ∅ for all t′ > t.
The event “buyer i wins at the end of period t conditional on the fact that he gets informed in
period s and his report is vˆi” (ignoring ties for simplicity) is the set of (vˆi, v−i) such that
v−i ∈ ×j 6=iVj;
i ∈ ψs(vˆi, v−i);
vˆi ≥ max{vj : j ∈ It(vˆi, v−i) \ {i}};
∅ = ψt′(vˆi, v−i),∀t′ > t.
Note that this set is F-measurable. Note that the validity of “i ∈ ψs(vˆi, v−i)” is independent of the
value of vˆi (Part 2 of the definition). Denote this event by A(i, s, vˆi, t).
The event “buyer i gets informed in period s and his type is vi and J is the set of those who got
informed before period s and vJ is the vector of their realized values” is the set of (vJ , vi, v−J∪{i})
such that
v−J∪{i} ∈ ×j 6∈J∪{i}Vj;
J = Is−1(vJ , vi, v−J∪{i});
i ∈ ψs(vJ , vi, v−J∪{i}).
Note that this set is F-measurable. Denote the event by B(i, s, J, vJ , vi).
Thus, the conditional probability of A(i, s, vˆi, t) given B(i, s, J, vJ , vi) is well-defined. This
conditional probability is the qi(· · · ) in Theorem 1.
Given any state v ∈ V , from the viewpoint of any period s = 1, 2, . . ., the ex post discounted
total search cost is
Cs(v) :=
∞∑
t=s
δt−s
∑
i∈ψt(v)
ci.
Note that Cs is a F-measurable function on V , and so is Cs(vˆi, ·) for any report vˆi ∈ V . Hence the
conditional expectation of Cs(vˆi, ·) given event B(i, s, J, vJ , vi) is well-defined. This expectation
value is the C(·) in the proof of Theorem 1. The conditional expectation Z(·) in that proof is
similarly well-defined.
We now prove the following result:
Lemma D.2 There exists a first-best search procedure.
Proof. We shall prove by induction on the number of buyers (which is assumed to be finite). The
single-buyer case is trivial. Pick any n = 1, 2, . . . and assume that a first-best search procedure
always exists whenever there are at most n buyers. We need only to prove the existence of first-
best search procedure for any case with n + 1 buyers. Suppose that a nonempty subset A ⊆ I of
buyers have acquired information and vA is the profile of their revealed values. Then the posterior
distribution of the other buyers’ values conditional on vA is determined. Maximizing the expected
social surplus conditional on this event amounts to finding a first-best search procedure for a search
problem with less uninformed buyers. In this sub-problem, the “seller’s value” is either the initial
seller’s value or the highest value among vA, whichever is larger; and I \A becomes the set of buy-
ers, whose values are drawn from the posterior distribution. The induction hypothesis implies that
a first-best search procedure for this sub-problem exists. Hence let Π(A,vA) denote the maximum
social surplus of this sub-problem. Consequently, the expected value Π(A) of Π(A,vA), with vA
being the random variable drawn from the prior distribution, is well-defined. The first-best search
procedure in the original problem amounts to maximizing Π(A) among all nonemptyA ⊆ I . Since
there are only finitely many such A, the optimum solution exists. Thus, first-best search procedure
exists when the number of buyers is n+ 1, as desired.
E. References
Bergemann, Dirk and Martin Pesendorfer (2001), “Information Structure in Optimal Auctions,”
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1323.
Bergemann, Dirk and Juuso Va¨lima¨ki (2002), “Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism
Design,” Econometrica, 70, 100- 1033.
Burguet, Roberto (1996), “Optimal Repeated Purchases When Sellers are Learning about Costs,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 68, 440-455.
Chakraborty, Indranil and Georgia Kosmopoulou. (2001), “Auctions with Edogenous Entry,” Eco-
nomics Letters, 72, 2, 195-200.
Cre´mer, Jacques and Fahad Khalil (1992), “Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract,”
American Economic Review, 82(3), 566-578.
Cre´mer, Jacques, Fahad Khalil and Jean-Charles Rochet (1998a), “Contracts and Productive Infor-
mation Gathering,” Games and Economic Behavior, 25(2), 174-193.
Cre´mer, Jacques, Fahad Khalil and Jean-Charles Rochet (1998b),“Strategic Information Gathering
Before a Contract is Offered,” Journal of Economic Theory, 81, 163-200.
Cre´mer, Jacques, Yossi Spiegel, and Charles Zheng (2006), “Optimal Search Auctions with Cor-
related bidder type,” Economics Letters, 93, 94-100.
Cre´mer, Jacques, Yossi Spiegel, and Charles Zheng (2007), “Optimal Search Auctions,” Journal
of Economic Theory 134, 226-248.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993), “Optimal Auctions Revisted,” Games and Economic Behavior, 5,
227-239.
Levin, Dan and James L. Smith (1994), “Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry,” American Economic
Review, 84, 585-599.
Klemperer, Paul (1999), “Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature,” Journal of Economic Sur-
veys, 13, 227-286.
Lewis, Tracy R. and David E. M. Sappington (1997), “Information Management in Incentive Prob-
lems”, Journal of Political Economy, 105, 4, 796-821.
Matthews, Steven (1984), “Information Acquisition in Discriminatory Auctions,” In Bayesian
Models in Economic Theory, ed. M. Boyer and R.E. Kihlstrom. Amsterdam: North-Holland
pp. 181-207.
McAfee, Preston and John McMillan (1987), “Auctions with Entry,” Economics Letters, 23, 343-
347.
McAfee, Preston and John McMillan (1988), “Search Mechanisms,” Journal of Economic Theory,
44, 99-123.
Myerson, Roger (1986), “Multistage Games with Communication,” Econometrica, 54, 323-358.
Persico, Nicola (2000), “Information Acquisition in Auctions”, Econometrica, 68, 1, 135-148.
Stegeman, Mark (1996), “Participation Costs and Efficient Auctions,” Journal of Economic Theory,
71, 228-259.
Tan, Guofu (1992), “Entry and R&D in Procurement Contracting,” Journal of Economic Theory,
58, 41-60.
Weitzman, Martin (1979), “Optimal Search for Best Alternative,” Econometrica, 47, 641-654.
Vishwanath, Tara (1992), “Parallel Search for the Best Alternative,” Economic Theory, 2, 495-507.
Ye, Lixin (2004), “Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry,” Contributions to Theoretical Eco-
nomics, 4, 1: Article 8. http://www.bepress.com/bejte/contributions/vol4/
iss1/art8
